

THE ROLE OF MEMBERSHIP RULES IN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

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Abstract

Regional integration is more likely to succeed if the region can mitigate the heterogeneity among state preferences, capacities and beliefs. This paper explores how different membership models affect the ability of organizations to reduce regional heterogeneity and promote integration. Drawing on existing research, the paper studies the advantages and disadvantages of different membership models ranging from inclusive convoys to exclusive clubs. The paper argues that convoys have advantages in certain areas of cooperation, but that generally clubs offer a wider and stronger array of tools of influence. However, no region begins with a clean slate with respect to regional integration arrangements; all regions face constraints in terms of existing institutional arrangements. The paper therefore explores the range of options for membership models, that is, ways that regions can alter their existing structure to progress along the path of integration. The paper discusses not only the initial membership rules, but also the ability to change these rules and use different levels of membership. It also considers the benefits of having multiple regional organizations in a form of layered integration. Drawing especially on the European experience, the paper then discusses modes of differential integration – options for varying membership is specific cooperation within an existing organization. The paper ends by considering the implications for Asia.

Executive summary

This paper explores how different membership models affect the ability of organizations to reduce regional heterogeneity and promote integration. The paper begins by discussing the elements of successful regional integration. It argues that the number of states cooperating is less important than the heterogeneity of preferences among the cooperation states. It explores particular areas of heterogeneity that can hamper cooperation such as different regime types, differences in information and beliefs and different levels of development and capacities to implement regional policies. The paper further argues that political and economic integration are related. A comparison of regional integration illustrates that regions with a high defensiveness about sovereignty have been more reluctant to build political institutions and less successful to advancing regional integration.

The next section of the paper discusses the mechanisms available for addressing heterogeneity and building foundations for successful cooperation. Drawing on existing research, the paper studies the advantages and disadvantages of different membership models ranging from inclusive convoys to exclusive clubs. The paper considers tools that organizations can use such as conditionality, associational membership, monitoring, socialization, issue-linkages, the

provision of institutional safe-guards for societal elites, workshops and legal training, as well as legal enforcement mechanisms and membership suspensions or expulsions. The paper considers whether these tools are best used with member states or non-member states, and when they are most likely to be effective.

The comparison suggests that convoys have advantages in certain areas of cooperation, but that generally clubs offer a wider and stronger array of tools of influence. Convoys have historically shown strength in promoting security and reconciliation, but clubs have also played important roles even in this area. Furthermore, clubs can set conditions for membership, yet still interact with non-members through trade and associational agreements. Some research even suggests that socialization efforts, the central method through which convoys seek to influence member states, work best when countries are seeking to join a club. Thus, the discussion of tools of influence, although far from exhaustive, suggests that clubs are better positioned to address the heterogeneity among states in the region.

However, no region begins with a clean slate with respect to regional integration arrangements; all regions face constraints in terms of existing institutional arrangements. The paper therefore explores the range of options for membership models, that is, ways that regions can alter their existing structure to progress along the path of integration. The paper discusses not only the initial membership rules, but also the ability to change these rules and use different levels of membership. It also considers the benefits of having multiple regional organizations in a form of layered integration. Drawing especially on the European experience, the paper then discusses modes of differential integration – options for varying membership is specific cooperation within an existing organization.

The paper ends by considering the implications for Asia and raising a set of questions.

1. Introduction

Regional organizations can pursue a wide array of membership models. The most inclusive choice is a “convoy” model, which allows all regional states to participate. Such organizations have low admission and participation criteria. They may still debate the admission of a given state, but the state is not asked to meet a set of formalized criteria as a standard condition of entry. At the other extreme, organizations may choose a “club” model, enforcing strict admission criteria.¹ The entry requirements may vary. For example, states may be required to have mechanisms for controlling corruption, or to implement the fiscal and monetary policies of the organization, or to respect human rights. Of course, organizations can choose a compromise between these models and membership rules can vary in many other ways.

How do these rules matter for regional integration? The membership rules reflect the preferences of the founding states and if the preferences change, the rules can also be changed. However, this does not make the rules inconsequential. The initial choices are made under uncertainty and imperfect information (Williamson 1985), and change may be difficult. Inertia of existing institutions may be hard to overcome, or some flagship organizations may become too significant to be easily circumvented. More importantly, to the extent that many developments are path-dependent, rules may produce outcomes that can limit future options. As Baldwin notes, “if the Treaty of Rome had expired after 50 years as did the ECSC Treaty, it would be absolutely impossible to get unanimous agreement on renewing the institutions from today’s 27 members (this volume, 64).” The choice of membership rules can thus shape the development of regional integration, because they determine which states control the decision-making structures and therefore influence the organization’s ability to cooperate and shape the organization in the future.


If all states in the region initially agreed on the nature of their cooperation and had no incentives to defect from their agreements, then the membership rules would be unimportant. However, it is never that simple. The core challenge for interstate cooperation and hence regional integration is heterogeneity among regional members. This is certainly true in Asia and it has been the case even in Europe. This heterogeneity takes three forms. The first is preference divergence: states in the region may prefer different political solutions to their common problems, or disagree about how to distribute the costs and benefits of cooperation among them. In trade and environment issues, for example, they may face issues of free riding, each state preferring to renege on its agreement while other states keep theirs (Schelling 1997). Or, even if they agree on the benefits of cooperation, states may disagree strongly about the exact policy solutions, preferring, in economic terms, different points on the Pareto frontier (Krasner 1991). Second, states may differ in their capacities to implement regional policies. Less economically developed states may have less administrative capacity, or their economic or political fundamentals may not be conducive to stable coordination with other states in the region. Last, states may vary in their information and beliefs. For example, they may have different political norms about domestic governance, sovereignty and interstate interaction. These divergent beliefs create normative and distributional struggles and make it difficult to adopt policies and enforce agreements (Keohane 1984 51-54). Thus, heterogeneity

¹ Note that here “club” is not used to signify that the organization is providing a traditional economic “club good” — that is, some private benefit that derives value partly from the exclusion of some actors, but merely to denote organizations that have high entry requirements.

among regional states in the form of divergent preferences, capacities and beliefs is the core challenge of intergovernmental cooperation and thus of regional integration.

Because of this heterogeneity, the choice of membership model -- whether organizations operate as convoys or clubs -- can influence the success of regional integration. Clubs can leverage higher entry criteria to solicit behavior changes prior to admission for any late joiners. However, convoys, with lower entry barriers can take a less confrontational approach to outlier states, interacting with them within the organization rather than erecting barriers. Thus, these different membership models offer different mechanisms for how an organization can influence states in the region, thus leading to greater regional convergence necessary for successful integration. This “R-H-I” relationship between rules, heterogeneity and integration is illustrated in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: The “R-H-I” relationship



The question therefore is: Is regional integration more likely to succeed if there are no barriers to entry and member states use post admission tools to solicit cooperation from each other? Or is regional integration more likely to succeed if it starts out with an exclusive organization of states aligned to the organizations goals and then erects high barriers to entry and use other various pre-admission tools to solicit behavior changes prior to admission for any late joiners? Thus, this paper asks: *what heterogeneity matters for regional integration efforts? What are the advantages and disadvantages of the different membership models with respect to influencing this heterogeneity of states in the region and building regional integration? How can organizations navigate the membership models to their advantage to deepen regional integration? And importantly: what are the options for changing existing membership models?*

1.1. Plan of the paper

The paper draws on the experiences of regional organizations, especially, but not exclusively, in Europe. The analysis draws on research from political science and economics, but it emphasizes the political analysis. A thorough analysis by an economist would render a useful complementary analysis.

The paper begins by discussing the elements of successful regional integration that may be influenced by membership rules. This section starts by discussing the relevance of the traditional concern that the sheer number of participating states hinders effective cooperation. However, arguing that heterogeneity is actually the central obstacle to regional integration in the “R-H-I” relationship, the paper then discusses the “H→I” relationship between heterogeneity and integration. What elements of heterogeneity matter for regional integration? In addition this section argues that there is an important relationship between political and economic integration, and that regional integration efforts therefore depend on national attitudes towards sovereignty. Through a regional comparison, the paper examines the relationship between sovereignty and regional integration further.

Next the paper focuses on the relationship between “R→H”, that is the relationship between membership rules and heterogeneity. It surveys the different tools organizations have available to address the heterogeneity among regional states, paying particular attention to how likely clubs and convoy designs are to use these tools successfully.

The next section then considers a broader range of membership models, not simply clubs and convoys, but also variations on the models that may allow regions to promote deeper integration and work beyond existing institutional structures.

The paper concludes by considering the implications for Asia. The paper does not provide answers, but it raises questions drawn from the insights of the paper, in the hope that those with greater Asia expertise can use the questions constructively.

2. Elements of successful regional integration

2.1. *Do numbers matter?*

Because membership rules influence the number of countries in an organization, it is important to consider whether the number of countries involved in regional organizations hamper cooperation. Traditionally, greater numbers of actors have been argued to hamper cooperation, but this conjecture may well be overstated and, in some instances, even misleading.

Traditional K-group theory argues that when enforcement is central to cooperation, as it most often is when there are complex rules and regulations that must be implemented and monitored, then more participants increase the enforcement problem and lower the benefits of cooperation (Olson 1965). This theory implies that for issues requiring enforcement, large organizations may be impractical, particularly if entry requirements are low as in convoys, leaving the organization with few enforcement options.

Regional experiences do seem to confirm this. The African efforts to move towards a single monetary zone illustrate the near difficulty of accomplishing such ambitious goals convoy-style. Thus, the 1991 Abuja Treaty the AU established the African Economic Community with the goal of achieving a single monetary zone for Africa by 2028. Various sub-regional groupings have proceeded highly unevenly, however, and some states have sought to break free of the laggards by creating their own “fast tracks” towards greater monetary cooperation (Nnanna 2006). Conversely, Mercosur has started with smaller numbers and been more successful. The same was true for the European Coal and Steel Community, which started only with the “inner six,” Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, while the so-called “outer seven,” Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, the countries that could not or did not want to join the European Economic Community (EEC), cooperated through The European Free Trade Association (EFTA).

Starting small by no means guarantees successful cooperation, as the relatively weak performance of the Andean Community, or many of African sub-groupings, demonstrates. However, whereas there are some examples of regional organizations that started small and have been successful, there are no examples of large regional organizations that have achieved the same level of regional integration *en masse*, although it may of course be possible for some organizations, such as ECOWAS, to eventually accomplish this. However, experience to date suggests that starting out with fewer states is a better formula for regional integration.

It is worth recalling, however, that the question of the relationship between number of member states and the depth of cooperation has been the focus in the classic widening versus deepening debate in the European Union (EU) (Hausken, Mattli et al. 2006; Lorz and Willmann 2008). Contrary to the critics of enlargement, the EU has been able to continue to deepen cooperation while also widening membership. Thus, although there is no precedent for launching a fully functioning common market for a large number of states simultaneously, there is little evidence that the number of cooperating states alone makes cooperation infeasible, although it undoubtedly makes it more cumbersome.

Indeed, the difficulty of cooperation with many members may have been attributed to numbers mistakenly. Recent work has found little support for the conjecture that in issue areas with greater enforcement problems, organizations tend to choose more restrictive membership models (Koremenos, Lipson et al. 2001). There is some evidence that organizations tend to restrict membership more under greater uncertainty, however, because in areas where compliance and cooperative behavior is less certain, entry requirements alleviate some uncertainty. However, rather than sheer numbers it appears the observed difficulties with cooperation among greater numbers likely stems from other fundamentals that change as more states are brought into the integration efforts; it is these changes, not the number of actors per se, that hamper cooperation (Keohane and Ostrom 1995 22-23; Snidal 1995).

Furthermore, institutional devices such as voting rules can ameliorate the difficulties of decision making introduced by wider participation (Kahler 1992 703). For example, the OSCE amended its consensus-based decision making structure to avoid de facto veto rights for any one state. Thus the OSCE adopted the "Consensus minus one" rule in 1992 so that in cases of a State's "clear, gross and uncorrected violation" of CSCE commitments, decisions could be taken without the consent of the State concerned (CSCE 1992).² Thus, the OSCE has changed some decision-making rules to address its wide membership, as has, of course, the EU, which has moved towards majority rules and other compromise decision rules on several issues. ASEAN, however, has maintained strong consensus-based rules. This poses problems under such pronounced heterogeneity as in ASEAN, and does make growing numbers of participants more problematic. The question of membership models is therefore related to, but distinct from, the question of the numbers of members or the optimal size of an intergovernmental organization. Numbers matter, but not merely because more is worse. More is worse only to the extent that more increase heterogeneity.

2.2. Heterogeneity

As noted in the introduction, states may vary in their capacities, their information and beliefs as well as in their preferences. Importantly, these factors are not fixed. Capacity, information and beliefs, and state preferences can change over time.

Central to the discussion of membership models and to the argument of this paper, these factors may themselves be influenced by the cooperative institutional arrangement in the region. That is, just as state preferences will determine the design of regional cooperation, so these regional cooperation choices may in turn influence the preferences of states in the region

² The then CSCE used this rule in 1992 to suspend Yugoslavia from the CSCE. The CSCE also adopted the "Consensus minus two" rule, which allows the Ministerial Council to instruct two disputing participating States to seek conciliation without their consent. So far, this option has not been put into practice.

over time (see also Hix, this volume). Nowhere has this been observed more than in Europe, where the EU has strongly shaped the member states and exerted immense influence on candidate states.

Because regional integration arrangements can influence states in the region it is important to consider how membership models vary in their ability to influence the behavior of states in the region; that is the “R→H” relationship. Therefore advantages and disadvantages of different membership models will be discussed later. First, however, it is important to consider the “H→I” relationship, that is: how does the heterogeneity of states matter for regional integration? What aspects of states are important in facilitating integration? What attributes of regional cooperation influence the success of regional integration? This consideration is important because it highlights the conditions that regional organizations need to address to deepen their cooperation. That is, it identifies what elements of heterogeneity is it important for regional integration efforts to minimize.

Many conditions that influence the success of regional economic integration could be discussed below. Indeed, economist would surely add an extensive list of domestic economic and financial factors (Gochoco-Bautista, this volume); just as legal scholars could surely add many aspects of harmonization of laws and domestic legislative requirements. The following discussion, however, focuses on other political and state characteristics that influence the success of regional integration.

2.2.1. Regime type

Discussing the African context in the 1960s, Haas noted that “countries which are poorly integrated internally make poor partners in a regional integration process because of the reluctance of leaders to further undermine their control at home (Haas 1970 619).” Much later, research is emerging that supports this claim. More generally, democracies have been found to be more likely to cooperate with each other on trade and finance. Democratic elections prompts leaders to cooperate more on international trade issues than their nondemocratic counterparts (Mansfield, Milner et al. 2002). That said, other scholars also contend that democratically elected legislatures may hinder multilateral cooperation (Rüland 2009). This is clearly something the EU has seen as it has struggled to get ratification of various treaties to deepen integration.

Neofunctionalists have also argued that integration has been most likely to emerge among richer liberal democratic countries, because these were less likely to have class conflict and ethnic rivalries and conflict and could gain from regional economic integration (Haas and Schmitter 1964). The process of integration was envisioned to occur through trade and labor and capital mobility. Such economic exchanges would eventually spill over into other areas, deepening regional integration. Thus, similar economic development and societal structures were viewed as optimal for deepening economic integration. Importantly for integration in diverse regions, states with different governance systems (democratic versus autocratic regimes) have a harder time cooperating (Leeds 1999).

Other research also suggests that domestic governance problems may affect the ability of a state to adhere to its international commitments more generally. States with a low rule of law or low administrative capacities are less likely to keep their international commitments (Simmons 2000; Weiss and Jacobson 2000; Kelley 2007)(Pevehouse, this volume). Some have argued, for example that in ASEAN, corruption and unreliable judicial systems hinder integration

because they make contracts hard to enforce. In Central Asia, for example, the autocratic super-presidential regimes hinder regional cooperation (Pomfret, this volume, 7). Significant research therefore suggests that domestic regime type influences intergovernmental cooperation, and that regions with democratic governments with a high rule of law have an advantage in terms of achieving regional integration.

2.2.2. Information and beliefs

Related to domestic regime type is research that suggests that cooperation benefits from shared information and beliefs (Keohane and Ostrom 1995). In cooperation that requires commitments and trust it is important that the participants share characteristics that define them as a community (Snidal 1995 65). In the 1960s authors writing about regional integration emphasized not only economics, but also the importance of culture and geography (Russett 1967; Caparaso and Choi 2002 482). In their work on the European integration process, Stone-Sweet and Sandholtz (1998 11) have argued that the main obstacles to economic integration is differences among national rules and norms, and that political integration therefore implies the need to either eliminate any differences or find ways to coordinate policies around them. Of course, potential member states need not require complete agreement on beliefs and information before starting regional integration, and, as discussed later, participating in regional integration efforts can itself contribute to the building of a shared identity and culture (Herrmann, Risse et al. 2004). However, the benefit of some considerable level of shared norms and beliefs upon entering into cooperation remains.

Venezuela's entrance into Mercosur highlights the importance of shared political beliefs. Oil-rich Venezuela's philosophical opposition to free trade and the nationalization of domestic industries has caused tensions as President Hugo Chávez has advocated for a shift in focus of the bloc, saying, "We need a Mercosur that prioritizes social concerns. We need a Mercosur that every day moves farther away from the old elitist corporate models of integration that look for ... financial profits, but forgets about workers, children, life, and human dignity."³ Thus, Venezuela's membership has caused considerable debate. As of August 2009, Brazil and Paraguay had yet to ratify Venezuela's membership in the bloc.⁴

2.2.3. Economic development and capacity

The ability of states to succeed in regional economic integration also depends on domestic economic conditions (Russett 1967). Differences in degrees of economic development present hindrances to creating currency unions (Haas 1970 619). Haas argued that such differences were central to the failure of LAFTA in the 1960s. Others similarly argue that the divisions between oil-poor and oil-rich states' in the Middle East have contributed to the failure most of the early regional integration attempts.⁵

Indeed, when it comes to economic issues, the question of "who should be part of the club" is a quite practical question of whether the underlying fundamentals in the prospective countries are compatible with the economic cooperation objectives. Thus, prospective members may simply not have the capacity or the economic fundamentals that makes it optimal for the organization to invite them to join in a particular form of economic cooperation (Bayoumi and Eichengreen

³ <http://www.cfr.org/publication/12762/#p6>, for Chavez statement <http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/1521>

⁴ [Paraguayan government withdraws bill for Venezuela's Mercosur incorporation](#). MercoPress, August 14, 2009. [Brazilian Senate condemns Venezuela further delaying its Mercosur bid](#). MercoPress, September 4, 2009.

⁵ <http://www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/20060117093527.O-2006-1.pdf>

1992). Less-developed states often have less administrative capacity to handle the commitments of integration. In ASEAN, for example, average GDP per capita ranges from \$209 to \$50,000 per year, and this presents a wide range of economic needs and capacities.

This is why the EU has spent so many resources on assistance programs to candidate states. The EU Phare program, for example, has not been purely altruistic aid, but an effort to bring candidate states to a comparable level of economic fundamentals. Furthermore, the European Commission has negotiated extensively with countries to insure that the countries have the capacity to implement community law. Much more could be added about economic conditions for successful regional integration, but suffice it here to make the point that domestic economic conditions are central when forging regional integration and that therefore states in a region must consider the domestic economic conditions and capacities to implement organizational commitments.

2.3. The relationship between political and economic integration

The heterogeneity among states in the region is also important because it influences the ability of the states to build joint political institutions necessary for economic integration.⁶ Already in 1964, Haas and Schmitter noted that deeper economic integration is facilitated by deeper levels of political integration: “[D]efinite political implications can be associated with most movements toward economic integration even when the chief actors themselves do not entertain such notions at the time of adopting their new constitutive charter (Haas and Schmitter 1964 707).” Furthermore, scholars of European integration has stressed the centrality of the political commitments to the integration efforts (Winters 1997; Moravcsik 1998) and the importance of institutions with independent authority (Pollack 2003) (Hix, this volume). Politics was central in the European Coal and Steel Community of 1951, which was intended to reduce Franco-German tensions, and politics has also been central in NAFTA, Mercosur, the ASEAN free trade area, and the Southern African Development Community (Schiff and Winters 1998 185). Indeed, in his seminal article on regional integration, Haas defined regional integration as “The voluntary creation of larger political units” (Haas 1970 608) and argued that without economic integration in the form of a common market, regional integration efforts were unlikely to have much influence on member states (Haas 1970 616). In the same work he also argued that in the process of regional integration, states cease to be wholly sovereign (Haas 1970 610). Thus, even if regional states initially do not intend for their cooperation to involve political dimensions, politics and economics are inevitably linked.

The linkages between economic and political integration rests on the distributional politics created by international economic factors and the relationship between domestic politics and economic performance. Elaborating these linkages between economic and political integration and the level of shared institutions required to address them is outside the scope of this article. However, the linkage is central to discussing membership models, because it suggests that the success of economic integration rests partly on the willingness of the states in a region to participate in some level of political integration. A common market or greater levels of economic integration requires political institutions and political cooperation. Thus, the absence of strong institutions within the ASEAN+3 frameworks, for example, poses challenges for deepening

⁶ Economists have created a typology of different levels of economic integration such as free trade areas, customs unions, common market, economic union, and full economic integration (Balassa 1961). These represent different levels of integration, although the necessity of the sequential nature is unclear (Caparaso and Choi 2002 482-483) (Baldwin, this volume).

integration (Dent, this volume, point 2.4). Fear of intrusions on sovereignty, as discussed later, are likely to hamper the development of common political institutions to facilitate economic and regional integration, as has been observed in the African Union and the League of Arab Nations.

2.4. Integration and sovereignty: Regional comparisons

Because regional integration depends on the characteristics of regional states and their willingness to build joint political institutions, effective regional integration cannot be a sovereignty-neutral process; States will need to delegate some authority to regional institutions (Bradley and Kelley 2008). Indeed, the choice of a club model is by definition an acceptance of some forms of organizational interference in domestic affairs, although this interference – at least theoretically – occurs with the consent of the state. As the following discussion demonstrates, regional experiences to date suggest that regional attitudes to sovereignty are fundamental to regional integration.

2.4.1. High defense of sovereignty, weak integration: the AU and the Arab League

Although the original OAU set ambitious goals rhetorically, in the wake of colonialism the primary goal of the member states was to confirm their own sovereignty and assure the existing borders (Herbst 2007 137). Thus, African regional organization tends to be highly inclusive, non-hierarchical, and attentive to national sovereignty (Herbst 2007 130). The OAU was effective at maintaining the boundary regime, but ineffective at promoting intergovernmental cooperation. Many attempts at economic unions have failed (Herbst 2007 132).

However, with the reorganization of the OAU into the AU, the organization has become more interventionist. The OAU refused to interfere in the "internal affairs" of member states, and stood by during the genocide in Rwanda. However, the constitution of the new AU permits collectively intervention in a member state to combat "war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity," and has taken action in Darfur (Cohen and O'Neill 2006). Breakthroughs have been limited to peacekeeping, however. The AU's attempts to build institutions to oversee human rights and elections have been toothless (Anglin 1998; African Union 2002; Kelley 2009a). The African Commission on Human and People's Rights created by the 1981 Charter on Human and People's Rights has no powers.⁷ Although the number of democracies in Africa has more than doubled since the organization's founding and although the African Union has begun to address coups by suspending the membership of several countries, these efforts have been ineffective and the organization has continued to be guided by lowest common denominator policies.

The Arab League experience is similar to that of the OAU. Cooperation was not hindered by an unwieldy number of members, as the original league only had seven members (Barnett and Solingen 2007 181). However, the League has not promoted regional integration, because Arab leaders, like those of Africa, created their regional organization mainly to protect their nations' sovereignty. Rhetoric of Arab unity was used to legitimize their regimes, but not to undertake cooperation that would delegate authority to the regional organization. Thus, the Arab League was created not to promote change, but to preserve the status quo (Barnett and Solingen 2007 182, 193). Ultimately the Arab League never has removed economic barriers and trade between member states has remained low. As in Africa, Common Markets and other

⁷ Nwankwo, Clement. The OAU and Human Rights *Journal of Democracy* Volume 4, Number 3, July 1993, 50-54.

economic measures remained weak, although the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) has been a step forward.⁸ The Arab League's conflict resolution track-record has been similarly unimpressive (Barnett and Solingen 2007).

Thus both the OAU and the Arab League were designed to be weak. The persistently low ambitions of their member states along with their convoy structure have ensured lowest common denominator policies. It is important to note, however, that their performance was not weak because they chose convoy structures, but that they chose convoy structures because they wanted to be weak and to protect their sovereignty.

2.4.2. Changing attitudes towards sovereignty: the OAS and ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Organization of American States (OAS) both started as convoys with fairly weak intergovernmental cooperation agendas, but subsequently undergone pressures to change as some countries in the region have increased their ambitions for the organizations role in regional cooperation.

ASEAN fit this pattern with regards to its non-interference policy. As the organization has matured, its ambition for regional economic integration has grown and it has launched some efforts such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the Trade in Services, both of which offer considerable potential in the future. It has also launched the Single Asian Market and the Comprehensive Investment Area, although these remain far from operational. However, the organizational members have been at odds over the membership criteria and the extent to which domestic conditions mattered when admitting states, a question that went directly to the organizations policy of complete non-interference on the part of the organization in domestic matters.

Disagreements about whether there should be any domestic preconditions for joining ASEAN began with the application of Vietnam and Cambodia (Acharya 2001 105). After Cambodia's coup, a special ASEAN foreign ministers meeting reaffirmed the commitment to non-interference, but also decided to delay admission of Cambodia and send an ASEAN delegation to Cambodia. Singapore's foreign minister said that if ASEAN had not delayed Cambodia's entry, this would imply that ASEAN condoned unconstitutional changes of government. This view revealed a possible shift in the non-interference doctrine by suggesting that forcible ouster of governments would violate an ASEAN norm. However, it was not a formal ASEAN position. Furthermore, the ASEAN position was that the reaction was justified because Cambodia's events violated the Paris Peace Agreement and were therefore not entirely domestic (Acharya 2001 116-117). In response to Cambodia, the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister suggested a policy of "constructive intervention." Although ASEAN rejected this policy, Thailand's foreign minister conceded that there was a recognition that "growing interdependence" meant that ASEAN needed to rethink some of its assumptions about non-interference (Acharya 2001 118-119).

ASEAN also delayed observer status for Myanmar and vigorously debated the extent to which Myanmar's internal politics were mattered for entry. Some countries advocated a demand for domestic policy changes, some stressed the non-interference doctrine and others argued that admitting Myanmar to ASEAN could have a positive impact on the domestic political situation

⁸ In 1997, fourteen Arab countries concluded an agreement to achieve the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA). By 2005 the tariff removal was complete, but the removal of non tariff barriers was not (Abedini and Péridy 2008).

(Acharya 2001 112-114). When ASEAN leaders signed a charter to further economic integration and committing to creating a human rights body in November 2007, several ASEAN countries threatened to refuse to ratify the charter until Myanmar improved its human rights record, but within a year they all ratified the agreement although Myanmar showed no progress. The human rights body has officially been created but lacks any real power and will be bound by the non-interference policy of ASEAN. The Charter is still very new and it is uncertain where it will take the organization.

In Asia more generally, the emphasis continues to be on sovereignty and non-interference (Caballero-Anthony, this volume, 21). The hesitant attitudes towards non-intervention and sovereignty may create institutional roadblocks for ASEAN, because they prevent the strengthening of the central secretariat to the degree necessary to carry out its goals (Severino, this volume, 26).

The experience of the OAS is interesting to compare with the ASEAN, because the OAS also started as an organization opposed to interference in domestic affairs. However, many member states have undergone strong changes during the 1970s and 1980s (Cooper and Legler 2001). Thus, in the last two decades OAS has also seen a period of convergence on higher preferences for intergovernmental cooperation and the states in the region have endowed the organization with greater influence in domestic affairs.

In the organizations' early years there were great disagreements about the extent to which the organization should interfere in domestic affairs to uphold democratic governance. The Inter-American Juridical Committee wrote a report reaffirming the Charter's commitment to human rights and democracy, but the Committee also upheld that the collective to restore democracy would be inadmissible under the terms of the Charter of Bogota. Thus, the 1959 Draft Convention on the Effective Exercise of Representative Democracy was too controversial and failed (Munoz 1993 33). Similarly, in 1962 the OAS excluded Cuba from decision power in the Organization, but the organization was passive as many dictatorships reigned during the 1970s.

However, the OAS has benefitted from the fact that democratization has been so pervasive in most of the regional states that the result has not been insurmountable divergence, but rather shared growing preferences for deeper cooperation. Thus, the organization has been able to make significant changes as the Cold war ended. Cooperation between member states has deepened and broadened over the organization's life span as nearly all states in the region have become more democratic and more interested in trans-border cooperation on drugs, corruption and many other issues.

Importantly, however, there is little evidence that it was the convoy-like structure of the OAS that lead to the convergence over time. Rather, many of the activities of the OAS to uphold democratic norms have only emerged after the countries in the region established their democratic regimes (Cooper and Legler 2001). The OAS was then able to capitalize on these national changes to institutionalize organizational procedures such as the Santiago Declaration and the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy to help the countries in the region to "lock in" these domestic changes. Thus, although the OAS has not changed its membership composition much, its membership rules have grown more club-like over time. That is, the membership criteria have hardened, making suspension and interference more likely. The changes were

gradual, however.⁹ Only decades of changes in domestic conditions led to a move away from strict non-intervention.

Ironically, even if the OAS has been able to deepen political cooperation, despite its organization of the Summits for the Americas, which launched the so far unsuccessful talks on the Free Trade Area of the Americas in 1994, the OAS has been far too large and diverse to act as an effective vehicle for regional economic integration. Regional sub-groups such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, Mercosur and the Andean Community - all organizations that have started as smaller clubs -- have instead begun to handle this challenge. The lesson of OAS therefore is that changes towards sovereignty came from the member states, not from the convey structure. Furthermore, whereas flexible attitudes towards sovereignty may be necessary conditions for productive regional integration, they are not sufficient for an organization to succeed.

2.4.3. Sovereignty in Europe

The European region differs strongly from the other regions because of the longer experience with democracy, the devastation of WWII and the accompanying East-West division, among other factors. Importantly, however, one of the ways in which the European region differs considerably from the regions where regional integration is less advanced is regarding attitudes towards sovereignty. Contrary to these other regions, the European organizations were founded on a desire to avoid the rouge state behavior that had led to the rise of Nazi Germany and the Second World War. Germany, one of the largest states, has thus supported the creation of a supranational structure to limit its own freedom (Krasner 2001), and other states have agreed to “pool” sovereignty in order to tie Germany’s hands. European countries also leaned to accept constraints through conditions attached to the Marshall Plan and to the provision of security through the Atlantic alliance (Wallace 1999 507). Furthermore, the Council of Europe was driven by a desire of states to use regional institutions to “lock in” their own commitments to democracy by tying their hands to the institutions (Moravcsik 2003).

Thus, the principles of sovereignty and non-interference had lower priority in Europe than elsewhere (Keohane 2002). Rather, states were keen to use the regional organizations to commit themselves to democracy and human rights. Supranational institutions became drivers of integration in Europe (Baldwin, this volume, 64). The growing regional interdependence has created further incentives for greater pooling of sovereignty (Keohane 2002 749). And the countries seeking to join the EU have been willing to do so at the cost of a reduction in sovereignty. Again, this has been facilitated by decades of oppression in communist states, and the desire of these newly independent states to avoid a repeat of this oppressive past. Thus, on all fronts, European states have been more tolerant towards intrusions into their traditional sovereignty.

3. Addressing heterogeneity and building foundations for successful cooperation

The preceding section has made three central sets of claims:

1. Heterogeneity is the main obstacle to regional integration. Several domestic characteristics of a state influence the success of regional integration. Therefore, regional integration is

⁹ For a good overview of the history of the many events that led to a deeper formalized OAS commitment to democracy, see (Munoz 1993)

more likely to succeed between democratic governments and governments who share cultures, norms and values. Regional integration is also more likely to succeed among countries with higher rule of law, or and among countries that have sufficient capacity to implement the obligations of membership in the regional integration efforts. Great disparities in economic development also hinder regional integration because the differences in economic fundamentals hinder stable coordination.

2. Political integration and economic integration are intricately linked. Therefore regional integration may be hampered when states are unwilling to create joint institutions.
3. As an extension of the above points, regional integration cannot be a sovereignty-neutral process. Greater opposition to interference has traditionally led to convoy designs and hindered regional cooperation. One of the defining features of the successful integration of Europe has been a more acceptant attitude towards pooling of sovereignty.

The “H” in the “R-H-I” relationship has thus been refined to encompass several domestic characteristics as well as attitudes towards joint political institution building and, by implication, attitudes towards sovereignty. The importance of heterogeneity means that regional integration cannot be separated from domestic governance issues or political integration. Visions of pure economic integration that ignore these areas are not particularly promising. Thus, even an organization that wishes to stick solely to a mandate for economic integration will have to build political institutions and consider some levels of political integration.

Furthermore, the greater the heterogeneity among regional states, the more an organization will have to consider how it can encourage domestic governance that will facilitate regional integration. The article therefore turns to considerations of the tools of influence associated with international organizations more generally.

3.1. *Mechanisms for shaping state behavior*

At the core of the question about membership rules is a deeper question that all intergovernmental organizations face: If regional integration is to be broad and successful, what is the best way of shaping the behavior of states in the region? Research suggests that the behavior of government and decision making elites can be influenced through at least two mechanisms.

The first is the use of incentives. Sanctions and political conditionality can change the incentive structure of decision-making elites by altering their payoffs for different behaviors (Crawford 1997; Hufbauer, Schott et al. 2007). This mechanism rests on the rationalist assumption that actors are cost-benefit-calculating, utility-maximizing actors. It is illustrated well by Bulgarian Prime Minister Ivan Kostov’s comment in April 2000 as Bulgaria was vying to join the EU: “With all my respect for the West, I am watching there only the opinion of the structures, which finance Bulgaria. All the others, whatever they say, are of no importance”¹⁰ (Kelley 2004b 428). Because they yield benefits for their members, intergovernmental organizations may be able to alter the incentive structures of non-member and member states in a variety of ways such as promising rewards or punishment for behaviors, or by providing institutional assurances that help governments commit to certain policies.

¹⁰ Reuters Wire Service, 14 April 2000.

The second mechanism seeks to change not simply the behavior, but the underlying preferences and beliefs of decision-making elites by socializing them into a new set of norms. Socialization does not link any material incentives to behavior but relies on persuading or shaming actors to get actors to change their policies or simply habituating them into new behaviors. It occurs through discourse, diplomacy and frequent interactions with state actors. Such socialization efforts may change behavior either by changing actors' beliefs or by appealing to a state's concern for its reputation (Johnston 2001 488; Kelley 2004b). Intergovernmental organizations may be expected to act as "sites of socialization" (Checkel 2005 806–808), because state agents are "exposed to alternative 'theories' about the nature of world politics?" (Johnston 2001 508–509). Thus, constructivist scholars have argued that institutions can not only constrain states, but can actually change their interests (Finnemore 1996; Checkel 1999; Checkel 2005) and help diffuse norms to member states (McNeely 1995). The managerial approach within international law also suggests that international organizations may cause states to redefine their own interests. Participation in organizational discourse and activities is said to be able to realign domestic priorities and induce compliance with organizational norms (Chayes and Chayes 1995 22). Convoy organizations are argued to be particularly well suited to facilitate dialogue and socialization (Acharya, this volume, 23)

Whether organizations are able to effectively employ these incentive and socialization mechanisms depends on what tools they have available before and after admission -- *ex ante* and *ex post* admission tools. Thus membership rules can influence regional state heterogeneity. This article naturally cannot assess the overall effectiveness of all these tools, but this section of the paper seeks to provide a catalog of measures and ask: How does the ability of clubs and convoys to use these tools differ? What are some possible dimensions of the relationship between membership rules and state heterogeneity: " $R \rightarrow H$ "? How important is the ability of clubs to use *ex ante* tools compared to the convoys' ability to use *ex post* tools? What advantages and disadvantages do the different organizational models bring to each of the tools of influence? This section ends with a summary, but the discussion below provides greater detail.

3.2. *Ex ante* tools

3.2.1. Membership conditionality

As discussed above, the strength of the club approach is its ability to put requirements on entry, and use of membership conditionality is thus by definition restricted to clubs. Downs, Rocke et al. argue that if an organization uses a club model to manipulate the order and timing of entries including first states who favor deeper cooperation, this allows it to reduce the negative consequences of increasing size or breadth on the depth of cooperation (Downs, Rocke et al. 1998).¹¹ Using a formal model, they argue that starting out small with a club model and then admitting more states as they align their preferences with the organization leads to organizations with greater depth than convoy models. That is, a club model with conditional enlargement can achieve both breadth and greater depth.¹² Forming smaller clubs and then

¹¹ Even some research on common pool resource problems, which are generally characterized by increased benefits the greater the participation, suggest that environmental problems may benefit from a club structure (Finus, Altamirano-Cabrera et al. 2005).

¹² "We show how the strategy of admitting potential members sequentially over time based on their preferences for cooperation ... produces a multilateral organization that will often be deeper at every stage of its development than would be obtained by an inclusive strategy; and it mitigates, even if it does not fully eliminate, the breadth depth trade-off so prominent in the existing literature. As a result, large multilaterals that start out small will tend to

relying on strict admission criteria also allows the existing members to establish their preferred policies before inviting outsiders (Hausken, Mattli et al. 2006 2). Clubs can therefore be much more demanding of newcomers, offering asymmetrical benefits to the core founding states.

These claims align well with the experiences of the EU. The initial six member states were able to cooperate on a deeper level closer to their preferences than had a compromise been reached with the states that choose instead to for EFTA. As EFTA states changed their preferences towards greater integration, they joined the EU, but they did so on the EU's terms, adopting wholesale the existing policies and obligations of the Union (Winters 1997 900). This does not mean that the new member states have been entirely unable to influence the future policies of the Union, but as a counterfactual, it seems plausible that the EU has reached greater depth of cooperation, because it waited to admit member states only as their preferences for integration changed.

Indeed, the European clubs have been quite effective at using membership conditionality. Because the organizations offer considerable benefits and because the organizations are clubs they have been able to extract considerable concessions from applicant states. This has been true even for the Council of Europe, although it does not offer benefits commensurate with those of the EU. However, because no state has ever joined the EU without first joining the Council of Europe, the Council has been able to benefit from the leverage of the EU attraction on non-member states. Still, the Council of Europe has applied membership conditionality with mixed results, partly because its broad membership has sometimes made it difficult for the organization to be consistent in its enforcement of the criteria. There are clear success cases, however. For example, since 1994, the Council of Europe has been effective at requiring the abolishment of the death penalty in any applicant states (Schabas 1999).

The EU in particular has been strict in its entry requirements and has grown even more so as it has fine-tuned its accession tools over the 1990s. For example, the December 1999 Helsinki European Council made it an explicit condition that a country must have stable democratic institutions, not only to join the EU but to be able to open negotiations to join the EU. This was why the opening of Turkey's negotiations was delayed once again and did not start until 2000. The success of the EU in using membership conditionality to solicit behavioral changes in candidate states is strongly established in the extensive literature on the subject (Kelley 2004a; Kelley 2004b; Vachudova 2005; Epstein 2008; Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008; Pridham 2008; Sasse 2008; Schimmelfennig 2008; Sedelmeier 2008). The tenuous transitions from post-communism were greatly aided by the assistance and incentives of the European organizations, leading to greater convergence of preferences between the formerly divided Europe and enabling broader and stronger regional integration.

Furthermore, the EU has been able to ensure that candidate states adopted the required legislation and created capacity to address their economic commitments of membership. Although candidate states have been able to choose how they would like to meet their obligations in many areas (Jacoby 2004), the candidate states have not been able to negotiate the content of their obligations as members; The rules of membership had to be taken as given at the point of entry (Grabbe 2003).

become considerably "deeper" in a cooperative sense than those that start out with many members" (Downs, Rocke et al. 1998).

Some argue that the candidate states have adopted policies much faster than current member states did. For example, Grabbe argues that, "It took Greece well over a decade to adapt to the EU's single market norms. By contrast, prospective CEE members are expected to have oriented their institutions and policies to the EU prior to membership, which means less than a decade in practice. Moreover, they have done so from a much lower starting-point and with very limited scope for negotiating transitional periods. The EU has been able to push CEE policy reforms faster than they would otherwise have gone because of the priority accorded to accession by their governments and because of the institutional lacunae resulting from communist era (Grabbe 2002b 4)." This would suggest that leverage is higher towards countries outside the club than inside it, and that therefore, all else being equal, the more behavioral adaptations the organization can extract prior to entry, the better.

Of course, the effectiveness of the club approach depends on whether the non-member states indeed do eventually align their preferences with the club members. But the EU case suggests that to the extent that the club is able to achieve deep cooperation that yields highly valuable benefits, exclusion may become too costly for non-member states, even if originally they preferred not to cooperate. Thus, strong regional clubs will likely present non-members with increasing incentives to meet the requirements to join the organization.

3.2.2. Associational memberships

The EU has also made effective use of degrees of membership, offering association agreements, pre-accession agreements etc. Advancing from one level of membership to the next has been a powerful incentive for candidate states, allowing the EU to use leverage at multiple points in time. The EU's accession process has evolved to include a multitude of steps and tools (Grabbe 2002a; Kelley 2004a). The more arduous the process and the more the number of evaluation points and stages of accession, the greater the opportunities for the organization to identify weaknesses, push for the adaptation of domestic laws and regulations and create decision points that focus attention on applicant states. The danger, however, is that the process is so arduous that it appears unattainable, as it has perhaps at times in the case of Turkey in relationship to the EU. This may have the effect of lowering the organizations credibility and thus its leverage vis-à-vis a candidate state.

Again, club organizations are more likely to be able to use associational or other intermediate memberships as a tool of influence. Whereas convoys may use associational memberships, these are not considered halfway stations to full membership and therefore to not provide leverage as such. As noted, for example, Myanmar had observer status in ASEAN for a while but this was short lived and had no influence on Myanmar's behavior. That said, associational memberships, or observer status, can be used by any organization to bring countries into institutional forums, thus increasing the opportunity for socialization, as discussed further below.

3.2.3. Ex ante Monitoring

Both the CE and the EU have used monitoring in conjunction with the accession process. The CE has extensive monitoring procedures and issues numerous political and legal recommendations before a country enters the organization. CE "rapporteurs" visit applicant countries and bring reports to the Assembly, which then passes resolutions recommending policy changes that must be accomplished before admission. Sometimes however, the CE accepts a commitment from the state to change the policy within a pre-set timeframe, most

commonly six months. Although no systematic research exists comparing the pre-accession conditions with these post-accession expectations, there is evidence that at least on some issues states are less likely to implement the changes if they are allowed to join the organization without having first implemented the changes (Kelley 2004b). This contrast offers an interesting insight in to the debate about whether it is easier to influence countries from within the organization or outside of it.

The EU has also used monitoring of candidate states very effectively. The European Commission, which oversees enlargement, instituted annual reviews that contained recommendations as to the readiness of each candidate states according to the goals set out in various other accession agreements. Candidate states know that their accession progress is closely tied to meeting the recommendations in the report. Thus, candidate states work eagerly to address concerns and await the issuance of each annual report with considerable anticipation (Kelley 2004a; Vachudova 2005).

As part of the monitoring, the EU has also worked to ensure that candidate countries have been ready take on their many obligations once inside the union. Thus, the Commission has negotiated the compliance with the entire body of EU law before entry, assisted prospective members to gain competency to implement their obligations of membership, and incorporated transition periods for countries in areas of obligations where they were not yet ready to join.

3.2.4. Suspending guest status

The EU has also used suspension of intermediate agreements to pressure states. Because it uses an extensive graduated approach to membership, there are numerous stages at which the EU can “suspend” the association and accession process. Thus, after the overthrow of the democratically elected Greek government in 1967, the EU suspended Greece’s Association Agreement. Some scholars argue this pressure was important in Greeks 1973 transition to democracy, because it undermined the military regime financially and politically. “Exclusion from the rapidly integrating Community was a singularly dangerous prospect (Coulfoudakis 1977; Verney and Couloumbis 1991 109).” The EU has also suspended the associations of candidate and guest observers on several occasions with Turkey, Belarus, Croatia and others. Again, influence on Belarus appears minimal.¹³ In Turkey’s case, it may as discussed have reinforced domestic beliefs that membership was unattainable.

The CE also suspended Belarus’ Special Guest status in 1997 due to the lack of progress on democracy, human rights and the rule of law the Council suspended this status and froze Belarus’ membership application the following year (Parliamentary Assembly 2009). However, so far at least, this suspension appears to have had little effect on the behavior of Belarus.

3.3. *Ex ante or ex post tools*

3.3.1. Exchanges, workshops and legal advice

Both clubs and convoys may engage in various activities to educate non-member states on a set of behaviors or norms. This may include education programs such as academic or parliamentary exchanges, or running workshops or conferences, all techniques used to various extents by the EU and the CE. Such efforts rarely produce large changes that can be captured by standard measurements. However, research has also shown that NATO was able to teach

¹³ See http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/belarus/intro/non_paper_1106.pdf.

some new liberal-democratic norms to incoming East European actors (Gheciu 2005). Furthermore, the Council of Europe and the EU have both offered such legal advice and often worked directly with national officials to formulate draft legislation before the countries entered the organizations (Grabbe 2002a; Kelley 2004a). The EU also offers “twinning”, a process whereby the EU sends a civil servant from an EU member state to advise candidate states on implementation of EU policies.

Most of the examples of these programs having any success are connected to clubs. At least this is the case in Europe. Indeed, scholars have argued that many of the efforts of monitoring and socialization of non-members may work only when used with states hoping to enter the organization (Johnston 2001). Convoy can practice these tools just as much as clubs. For example, the OSCE has engaged extensively in providing legal advice on the protection of national minorities. However, the effect of OSCE efforts has been contingent on EU cooperation (Kelley 2004a).

Furthermore, the little research there is on the effectiveness of workshops and legal advice and so on, has focused on the teaching of political norms and behaviors. This is primarily because these tools are not typically employed to get states to comply with an organization’s economic policies, for example.

3.4. *Ex post tools*

3.4.1. Socialization

After admission, organizations may seek to socialize member states through monitoring and educational programs, and legal advice, as well as exposure to organizational discourse through member state interactions. Convoy organizations have to rely more heavily on this mechanism, as the *ex ante* tools are not available to them. Furthermore, because convoy organizations admit more outlier states, they are a greater need to socialize member states to enable institutional cooperation.

As noted earlier, scholars have argued that intergovernmental organizations may be expose state agents to alternate views and socialize them into new norms (Chayes and Chayes 1995; McNeely 1995; Finnemore 1996; Johnston 2001; Checkel 2005 806–808). However, empirical research on socialization is still scarce, due mostly to the difficulty of measuring preferences and identifying sources of preference changes. Subsequently, research on socialization within intergovernmental organizations lacks the consensus about effectiveness that exists about membership conditionality.

Some scholars have found evidence of socialization within international organizations. Bearce and Bondanella (2007 721) argue that intergovernmental organizations promote the convergence of member state preferences as measured by voting records within the UN General Assembly. Interestingly, they find the strongest effect of this within Asia. Kent also documents several issue areas ranging from disarmament to labor rights, where China has redefined its interests via participation in international organizations. Sometimes this has been a pragmatic adjustment, but in other cases it has led to institutionalization of norms within China (Kent 2002). Acharya (this volume) also documents several instances of socialization of Vietnam, China and India.

However, research on socialization has focused primarily on norms and political behaviors. As discussed earlier, the CSCE directly contributed to changes on human rights behavior within the participant states. The participation of Gorbachev and other high level officials led to significant learning within the Russian government, and, ultimately to changes in behavior (Thomas 2001; Thomas 2005). UNESCO has also successfully taught member states about the importance of creating national scientific agencies and this has led to the creation of such agencies in many member states (Finnemore 1993). Other research also finds some evidence of socialization of domestic militaries after admission to NATO (Tovias 1984 167; Pevehouse 2003 528-529). Finally, several regional organizations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the OAS and others monitor elections in member states in an effort to teach electoral norms. Success has been mixed, but it exists (Kelley 2009b).

Furthermore, some scholars find little evidence of socialization within organizations. Some researchers have found that the views of EU officials are largely determined by their domestic factors (Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005). Others also dispute that there are any effects of intergovernmental organizations more generally on member state preferences (Boehmer, Gartzke et al. 2004 2). Efforts by the COE and the EU to the post communist states through a series of interactions and reprimands tended only to work when domestic opposition to the norms were already weak, or when domestic actors favoring the norms held some power within government coalitions, or when these socialization efforts were combined with powerful membership incentives from the EU (Kelley 2004b; Kelley 2004a). Furthermore, Myanmar has been a clear example that ASEAN's policy of constructive engagement, which rests entirely on a philosophy of socialization, is not working. Prior to admission Myanmar made some minor concessions on the repatriation of Muslim refugees (Zaw 2001 43), but nothing more. After admission, Myanmar ratcheted up its oppression of the opposition instead, having seen the admission to ASEAN as a sign of legitimacy. Critics have noted that: "Expansion has not enhanced ASEAN bargaining power (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2001 50)." Thus, the evidence that socialization may build trust and change beliefs is weak. The prior discussion of the changing attitude towards cooperation within the OAS also suggests that these did not come about as a result of socialization within the organization, but that domestic changes in member states instead drove reforms within the OAS.

Moreover, there is little research on whether socialization works on economic issues which are so central to regional integration efforts. Theory suggests that to the extent that defection from economic commitments is important, building trust through interaction within organizations is important. However, given that organizations that deal with economic matters typically also have some specific policy-related entry requirements, or have some enforcement mechanisms, it is difficult to establish whether any states were ever socialized into keeping their economic commitments. Certainly that is the case in the EU. In general, EU member states do keep their commitments, including their economic commitments. As discussed below, EU member states now implement about 96 percent of their commitments satisfactorily (Tallberg 2003). Interestingly, however, in 90 percent of violations of commitments, the EU Commission is able to name and shame violating states by publishing the violations. However, it is unlikely that this apparent socialization is really socialization at all, because all states know that the alternative to compliance is court action, as discussed more below.

Furthermore, when France and Germany missed the targets of the Stability Pact in 2003 (Buti and Pench 2004), the EU has not been willing to use socialization tools to shame these

countries, let alone resort to the preset sanction measures. Thus, on such large economic matters and for powerful member states, pure membership in an organization does not appear to install a sense of obligation or appropriateness that leads states to comply when other economic interests are at stake.

To the extent that organizations can socialize states, is there any reason to think that this ability differs for convoy and club organizations? To date no research has been done that compares convoys and clubs with respect to socialization, partly because the comparison would be complicated by many other factors.

Is the environment within a convoy organization more conducive to socialization on some issues? Perhaps the more inclusive nature of the organization creates a better opportunity for constructive dialogue? Consider the OSCE predecessor, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, founded with the Helsinki Act in 1975 at a time in history when the security preferences of European states diverged enormously. Indeed, some states were enemies. Given that the purpose of the Act was “to improve and intensify their relations and to contribute in Europe to peace, security, justice and co-operation as well as to rapprochement among themselves,”¹⁴ excluding potential member states through strict membership criteria would defeat the organization’s very purpose to recognize “the indivisibility of security in Europe as well as their common interest in the development of co-operation throughout Europe and overcome differences.”¹⁵ A club model would be more likely to increase hostilities, as demonstrated by the enlargement of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which increased trust with new members, but raised hostilities with the still excluded Russia (Kydd 2001). Thus, it does appear that convoy models have an advantage over clubs when it comes to issues of reconciliation and security. This is important because regional integration efforts may not always begin with economic considerations. Indeed, as noted earlier, the EU, Mercosur, and ASEAN were motivated by political security considerations as well as economic goals.

On the other hand, if convoys are more diverse because of their lower admission criteria, perhaps when it comes to socialization on political issues other than security, their persuasive power is lower. Thus, research has found that the ability of international organizations to influence the level of democracy in member states depends in part on how democratic the organizations general membership is (Pevehouse 2003).

The absence of strong evidence for socialization sans strong enforcement measures does not mean that such socialization does not occur. However, the relatively weak evidence for socialization within organizations is nevertheless important for the question of the advantages and disadvantages of the different membership models. This is because convoy organizations have to rely on socialization within organizations more so than clubs do, because convoys cannot use *ex ante* tools, and because convoys are more likely to admit outlier states that may encumber other organizational efforts to influence member state behavior.

3.4.2. Institutional safeguards for societal elites

Another way regional organizations may influence member states is by influencing domestic stakeholders. This is particularly important on economic matters. Some research suggests that

¹⁴ Helsinki Final Act, 1975. Introduction.

¹⁵ Ibid, Questions relating to Security in Europe.

regional organizations make business interests more supportive of economic liberalization. By raising the costs of domestic policy changes, regional organizations help guarantee business elites of their economic interests, thus making them more amenable to liberalization (Pevehouse 2003 526). Other research has found that regional trade arrangements help lock in commitments among states (Milner 1995; Fernandez and Portes 1998; Goldstein 1998; Mansfield 1998; Mansfield, Milner et al. 2002). Such commitments ensure elites that free trade will continue even if the regime moves towards more democracy. Regional organizations that institutionalize free trade agreements by promoting regional integration may therefore be able to influence outlier states in the region to liberalize both economically and politically.

Some research also suggests that regional organizations can decrease the domestic military's concerns that liberalization and regime openness will sideline the military. Southern European governments were able to internationalize the military's role through integration in NATO (Pridham 1994). Some work suggests that by increasing resources for the military, PFP/NATO membership was important for lowering military resistance to political opening and thus the completion of the transition in Hungary (Vetschera 1997 19). Thus, membership in regional organizations may increase the willingness of both economic and military stakeholders to liberalize.

However, it is uncertain whether convoys and clubs are equally capable of promoting this stakeholder effect. The examples above tie to trade and the provision of resources in the EU and NATO, suggesting that these benefits that are more likely to be associated with trade-related organizations. Importantly, however, it does not really seem to matter whether countries are actually full members of an organization. The stakeholder effect may occur even *before* the countries become full members of the organization. For example, to join the EU, countries first sign Association Agreements that allow them to begin to benefit from trade and other arrangement with the Union. The Association Agreements in the then ECC were an important factor in the democratization of Portugal (Manuel 1996) and Spain (Whitehead 1986; Powell 1996), even though they did not admit these countries to the organization, but only formalized trade and other agreements. These agreements with the EEC helped assure the domestic elites that democratization would not lead to loss of property or hinder the free movement of goods (Whitehead 1996 271).

Thus, the types of guarantees required to move stakeholders tend to be economic in character and these guarantees can be rendered to countries in intermediate associational membership arrangements as well as to full members. This suggests that club organizations, which are more likely to have deep economic assurances to offer, are not hindered by their organizational exclusionary structure in using these tools of influence. Convoy organizations can clearly also use these types of guarantees, but they may have less guarantees to offer if they have not been able to develop deep economic integration.

3.4.3. Issue-linkage

Some scholars have argued that admitting countries to an organization can draw them into a set of interrelated bargains that influence the interests and negotiating positions of states (Sandholtz 1996). For example, research has found that in situations of asymmetric externalities, as in many environmental cooperation problems, welcoming states into an organization induces perpetrators to join and broadens the cooperative scope to take advantage of opportunities for issue-linkage (Mitchell and Keilbach 2001). No research, however, compares

the ability of convoys and clubs in using issue-linkage. At first, it may seem that clubs are at a disadvantage, because it is harder to link issues with non-member states. This may be mitigated somewhat, however, by given non-members associational status. Still, clearly convoys where all countries are equal members, increase the opportunities for issue linkage. However, if convoys tend to have shallower cooperation, then the linkage may not be very powerful.

3.4.4. Legal enforcements

Another tool for influencing member states is various forms of dispute resolution mechanisms ranging from informal ad hoc non-binding mechanisms to formal courts with binding authority can serve as important compliance tools after admission. The Council of Europe as well as the EU has well-developed courts, whereas many other convoy-style regional organizations rely on their Councils to settle disputes about whether member states are complying with their commitments (Tallberg 2003).

In the infringement procedure under Article 226 (ex. Art. 169), the Commission functions as prosecutor and the ECJ as judge. It is interesting, however, that the Commission first attempts to name and shame violating states by publishing the violations, before it uses its power to bring cases to court. Indeed, only about 1 in 10 cases end up with the ECJ as most member states prefer finding amicable solutions. Thus, the rate of legal implementation of EU directives has been high for a long time, but in the 1990s it rose to about 96 percent (Tallberg 2003). The threat of the court is thus a very important tool in achieving compliance.

In the Council of Europe, a more open club than the EU, the European Court of Human Rights has been a strong tool for the Councils continued influence in member states after admission. However, the compliance with court decisions is lower than in the EU.

The relevance of these legal enforcement mechanisms to membership models is that not all membership models may be able to acquire and apply such mechanisms equally well. Effective dispute resolution mechanisms and courts may be harder to acquire and use in convoys than in clubs. Few organizations have effective courts yet, so it may be too soon to draw conclusions, but the fact that no convoy organization has really developed an effective court may well be because the greater preference divergence prevents support for such features or makes their use intractable under consensus rules. Meanwhile, it is interesting to note that the Council of Europe, which has a more heterogeneous membership than the EU on its own core issue of human rights, developed its court during a time when the member states were more heterogeneous than they are today. Thus, path dependence may have played a big role in the existence of the ECHR, which is one of the few cases where an organization that has considerably lower entry requirements than the EU still has a relatively effective compliance tool. Furthermore, the success of the ECHR has been greatly enhanced by the Council of Europe's overlapping membership and cooperation with the dominant regional club, the EU. Thus, no country has ever joined the EU without first joining the Council of Europe, for example.

However, in spite of a strong legal enforcement system, it may difficult for regional organizations to successfully sanction their own member states, especially if sanctions are costly for all of the organizations' members. When France and Germany missed the targets of the Stability Pact (Buti and Pench 2004), they promised to up their ante, so the Commission took no action. Punitive proceedings were started against Portugal (2002) and Greece (2005), but never

applied. Thus, even strong legal tools may be useless in addressing fundamental economic issues that conflict with national interests.

3.4.5. Suspensions

Finally, organizations may be able to suspend or expel member states, as has occurred in several instances such as the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth, Egypt from the Arab League, and Guinea from ECOWAS.¹⁶ Suspensions and expulsions are drastic measures and they are difficult to execute because they require a high level of agreement within the organization. Convoys lack high membership standards and the diversity of member state preferences within the organization will make agreement on such drastic censures of another member states more difficult. When Jordan was perceived as violating the League's norm of Arab nationalism in 1950 as he negotiated a peace treaty with Israel, the League discussed expulsion of Jordan but ultimately settled on a strongly worded warning resolution prohibiting any peace agreement (Barnett and Solingen 2007 197).

This is important, because suspension and expulsion are the most tangible tools convoys organizations have. Such actions appear to have had only mild success. In 1992 the OSCE came up with the principle of "consensus minus one" to suspend the FYR. The attacks on Bosnia-Herzegovina flagrantly violated CSCE commitments. The suspension of Serbia and Montenegro continued for eight years, but it seemed to achieve little. There was great debate within the OSCE about the best course of action. Writing in 1998, Perry noted that keeping the FYR out of the forum of debates in the organization and being unable to send representatives to engage in dialogue was ineffective (Perry 1998 54).

Both the African Union and the OAS has become increasingly willing to suspend member states recently, but most of the time the target states merely shrugs off the act as has occurred most recently in Honduras. However, in one case in particular, a suspension may have had some effect. After the auto-coup by the Jorge Serrano In May of 1993, some argue that the OAS played a critical role by criticizing Guatemala and moving to sanctions the regime. The military forced Serrano from office within five days and installed a civilian regime (Farer 1996; Cameron 1998). Still, any such case is naturally over-determined, so that the cause of the event cannot be isolated analytically.

The EU has only once sanctioned a member state by curbing relations. This occurred in the case of Austria, when the extremist Austrian Freedom Party led by the racist Jörg Haider entered the Austrian government. Virulent debate ensued within the EU, but the diplomatic sanctions had no effect on Austrian politics. Haider did step down from his party's leadership eventually, but retained control.

In sum, there is not much evidence that suspensions or expulsions are effective tools for convoys or for clubs. They elicit strong disagreements within the organization, and target states are too preoccupied with domestic affairs to care. Furthermore, suspensions and expulsions tend to relate to political more so than economic matters, so there is little use for suspensions or expulsions as a tool of economic integration for neither convoys nor clubs. That said, expulsions or suspensions may be necessary on principled grounds, but that is not the focus of the present analysis.

¹⁶ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/11/content_10637610.htm

3.5. Summary

Table 1 summarizes some of the observations from the above discussion about some of the available research on the effectiveness of various tools for clubs and convoys towards non-member and member states. The discussion above does not cover all the possible tools. For example, the use of aid and assistance programs is omitted, as are use of sanctions. Aid programs were omitted because their effectiveness is unlikely to depend on membership models, although their use is more likely to occur with rich trade clubs that have significant resources to expend. Sanctions have not really been a tool of regional organizations, although theoretically it could be.

Table 1: Summary of tools

| | Clubs | Convoys |
|---|---|--|
| <i>Membership conditionality</i> | Extensively used. Strong effects, both political and economic. | Not relevant |
| <i>Associational memberships</i> | Extensively used. Strong if used in conjunction with accession. | No purpose, unlikely to have any effect |
| <i>Ex ante monitoring</i> | Extensively used. Strong if used in conjunction with accession. | Not relevant |
| <i>Suspending association status for non-members</i> | Occasional use. Weak. | Not relevant |
| <i>Exchanges, workshops, legal advice</i> | Weak, directly mostly at political issues. | Weak. Any effects of OSCE appear related to cooperation with EU |
| <i>Socialization</i> | Mixed results that appear contingent on the threat of enforcements or on the existence of inducements | May have advantages on broad issues concerning security. May be weaker on political issues due to greater organizational heterogeneity |
| <i>Institutional safeguards for societal elites</i> | Results uncertain. If it matters, it is likely to work best in trade areas and it is just as likely to work pre-accession, as long as trade occurs. | Rare and uncertain. |
| <i>Issue-linkage</i> | Common with both associational members and non-members through special agreements | Uncertain. |
| <i>Legal enforcements</i> | Common. Effectiveness depends on enforcement. | Rare and if it exists, likely weak. |
| <i>Suspensions</i> | Weak | Weak |

Furthermore, the discussion of the different tools of influence cannot be added up to some definitive statement about which membership model is best. The above discussion has made no attempt at such comprehensive evaluation, nor would such an evaluation based on past events necessarily predict future outcomes. However, the discussion does suggest some insights.

- On some issue areas such as security, for example, the conciliatory and inclusive nature of convoy organizations retain advantages over clubs.
- However, clubs do appear to have more tools at their disposal and these tools have, at least in the European context, been quite strong. Of course, it is important to recall that this context also includes the unique post-communist environment that accompanied the end of the Cold War.
- More generally, the discussion shows that membership models cannot be assessed independently of the activities and tools of the organizations. The power of a convoy organization may for example be greatly enhanced by a strong judicial system, or by close cooperation with other regional organizations that may be able offer leverage.
- Furthermore, states need not have full membership before an organization can interact with them. Thus, clubs can extend various levels of inclusiveness that may offer opportunities for interaction akin to that of convoys.

4. How to proceed? Options for modes of integration

So far this paper has argued that political integration and economic integration are linked, and that regions wishing to develop deeper economic integration therefore must be prepared to develop deeper political integration. The process of regional integration cannot be sovereignty neutral. Regional integration is more likely to succeed if the region can mitigate the heterogeneity among states in their preferences, capacities and beliefs. This entails a concern with domestic affairs, just as the creation of regional institutions entails some delegation of authority.

Furthermore, large numbers alone does not necessarily hinder intergovernmental cooperation, but that as the number of states increase, their heterogeneity will like increase and therefore introduce greater complications for cooperation. The more successful attempts at regional economic integration have shared the feature of starting with relatively few member states.

The comparison of the tools of influence of club and convoy models has also suggested that club models have a greater array of tools at their disposals. Convoys have historically shown strength in promoting security and reconciliation, but clubs such as the EU and Mercosur have also played important roles even in this area. Furthermore, clubs can set conditions for membership, yet still interact with non-members through trade and associational agreements. Some research even suggests that socialization efforts, the central method through which convoys seek to influence member states, work best when countries are seeking to join a club. Thus, the discussion of tools of influence, although far from exhaustive, suggests that clubs are better positioned to address the heterogeneity among states in the region.

High admission criteria also reduce uncertainty about the behavior of the new member state. If states have to implement policies before joining, the likelihood that these policies will continue to comply with organizational standards is much higher. This is particularly important in economic matters when the interdependence among member states is very high, such that

failure by new entrants to follow the organization's policies will impose high costs of existing members.

The reality of the matter, however, is that many regions, from Latin America to Asia, the Middle East to Africa, launched their regional integration efforts through pan-regional convoy organizations. This was foremost to protect national sovereignty. In other cases it was also to promote reconciliation. Thus, both the OSCE and ASEAN assumed convoy form to build confidence and security in their regions.

More importantly, no region begins today with a clean slate with respect to regional integration arrangements. Europe is far progressed, whereas the other regions, although many have been engaged in regional integration efforts for decades, have still only made modest advances. Because of these efforts, however, all regions face constraints in terms of existing institutional arrangements. Yet they also have a considerable range of options for membership models in the future. Even Europe continues to discuss the optimal modes of integration. Thus, although no region begins with a clean slate, and although existing arrangements impose some path-dependency, regions continue to evolve and still have the ability to shape the nature of their integration patterns.

In sum: regional integration cannot be apolitical or sovereignty-neutral. Cooperation is hindered but not impossible in regions with many heterogeneous states. Club models offer the best array of tools for reducing heterogeneity and promoting integration. Yet, regions have to work with their existing arrangements as a starting point.

So this brings up the introductory question of this paper: *How can organizations navigate the membership models to their advantage to deepen regional integration?* Clearly organizations such as the AU, the OAS, or ASEAN cannot disinvite current members. They could expel members, but as noted, that has not been terribly effective, nor would that be a positive start to deepening regional integration. However, if regions have adopted a convoy model in the past, the variety of regional organizational forms to date suggest ways that regions and organizations can evolve and in so doing develop cooperative arrangements that draw on the lessons of this analysis in the future.

4.1. Option 1: Degrees of Membership

First of all, if all regional states are not already members, organizations can make greater use of varied associational forms. If an organization uses multiple levels of association, it can also employ different participation requirements for different levels. Observer states usually have few rights within the organization except to observe. Associate members, however, often have some rights and can obtain benefits from the organization. Observer or associate states sometimes are states that do not have a prospect of full membership, but they are frequently members in waiting. In both cases, an organization may be able to bring countries into their institutional forums by granting them such intermediate levels of association. This may enable these states to be part of important debates within the organization and it may enable the organizations to set some conditions for the association. Thus, an organization may allow states to participate as observers or associate members, and these levels of membership can provide opportunities both for socialization as well as for continued leverage over prospective members.

4.2. Option 2: Entry requirements can change

Entry requirements evolve as an organization deepens the scope and depth of cooperation. The greater the organization's existing body of rules and regulations, the greater the requirements for entering the organization, as any new member will need to take on the obligations of membership and existing organizational law. Thus convoy organizations need not remain convoys with respect to future members. Organizations can introduce new entry requirements any time, even if such have not traditionally existed. The Copenhagen Criteria introduced new requirements for joining the EU. New member states have to meet requirements that the initial members were not asked to meet. Thus, although an organization like ASEAN or ECOWAS may not have had certain requirements in place upon their founding, new requirements can be added. This can be partly because the organization has evolved and requires a different level of preparation before members can join smoothly, or it can be simply because the existing member states decide to impose new requirements. Furthermore, this need not mean that old member states will be scrutinized over these standards. The EU efforts at addressing ethnic minority problems in candidate states in the 1990s did not mean that the then current members became subject to similar examination and requirements. This may seem unfair, but the reality is that the current members can set the rules.

4.3. Option 3: Multiple institutions

4.3.1. Layered integration through complementary institutions

Although regions have created a convoy organization, not all cooperation need proceed within the frameworks of this organization. Rather, regions can take a layered approach to integration. That is, regional integration may proceed via multiple institutions created to address different issues. This occurs in all regions, but Europe has again been particularly successful at using this structure of complementary institutions. Thus in Europe, separate regional organizations were created to address different issues: security, human rights, economics and political integration.

Instead of a multi function pan-regional convoy organization such as the AU or the OAS, the Europeans thus chose to create a combination of organizations: The Council of Europe was the founded in 1949 among ten West European states to address human rights issues. The founding members of the Council of Europe shared a set of human rights norms, and the Statute of London states that countries seeking to join the organization have to meet these standards and can be suspended if they do not.¹⁷ As such, the Council is a club organization, although its membership criteria are not as broad or elaborate as that of the EU. The Western European countries also formed two clubs, EFTA and the EEC (which evolved into the current day EU), to initiate economic cooperation at different levels (CROSS REF here to OTHER WORKSHOP PAPERS). Over the decades many of the EFTA members that originally preferred more limited economic cooperation have joined the EU.

To address security issues, a smaller group of countries signed the Brussels Treaty in 1948 and when they were joined by Germany and Italy in 1954, the Western European Union was created. Membership remained at 10 countries, however, although several other countries became observer states or associate members. Much later, in 1975, the pan-regional East-West spanning CSCE was created with a narrower security mandate. Initially the CSCE was a

¹⁷ Statute of the Council of Europe, 1949, Article 3-8. Statute of Rome, European Treaty Series - Nos 1/6/7/8/11.

Conference, not an organization, but the “negotiation shop” was open to all the states in the region and as such was a convoy-style “organization.”

The main advantage of this approach is that it allows regions to apply different organizational membership models to different issues. Given that the nature of different issue areas may favor different membership models, this differentiation can be advantageous. Furthermore, as opposed to the models of differential integration described below, complementary institutions can have completely separate decision-making and administrative structures. This can allow greater institutional autonomy and avoid complex hierarchies within one organization.

Importantly, however, the European organizations have worked closely together. The former communist states, which were originally excluded entirely from economic cooperation in Europe, have also joined the both the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the EU after making vast changes to their domestic politics and regulations. Regional integration in Europe has thus emerged from a very diverse set of states through a network of interlocking organizations that were, as discussed below, able to mix convoy and club models to influence the states in the region.

Other regions may be able to emulate this model to some degree. It suggests, for example, that regional human rights or monetary organizations may not be best situated within the existing convoy structures created to address security issues, as is for example ASEAN's recent efforts to create an Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights. Rather, separate organizations, perhaps with fewer, but more committed members, may be able to initiate deeper cooperation on human rights or on monetary issues if they are not held to the lowest common denominator of the existing convoy structure. Such an organization may benefit from greater institutional autonomy than it would enjoy if it were institutionally embedded within the convoy, yet, close cooperation can be sustained.

4.3.2. Dangers of Sub-grouping

A different pattern of integration is when states in a region form subgroups that can exploit their homogeneity and smaller size to form multiple organizations. Sociologists have referred to this as nested enterprises (Ostrom and Benjamin 1993), and it occurs when a region ends up with multiple sub-regional organizations that individually pursue the same objectives, such as for example, coexisting common markets that cover different countries within the same region. Thus the difference between sub-grouping and layering is that layered integration consists of regional organizations that address different issues, whereas sub-grouping consists of organizations that address the same issues, but do so in smaller groups of states.

Africa, for example, has multiple Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that are formed between sub-groups of states in the region.¹⁸ These RECs are nested within the African Economic Community (AEC), but they often have overlapping membership. In addition, there are RECs that are not organized within the AEC. Altogether this makes for a very fragmented structure of regional and sub-regional organizations, all of which are progressing towards their stated goals of free trade areas and customs unions and very different speeds and not following similar standards and procedures. This greatly complicates the attainment of the AECs goals of a single market and a central bank, despite rhetorical commitment to these goals.¹⁹

¹⁸ <http://www.dfa.gov.za/au.nepad/recs.htm>

¹⁹ <http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5i0GmLiOhihzyOZ4WZrjTghIGPosQ>

Merging sub-groups may not be so simple. EFTA and the ECC were essentially two sub-groups both created to address economic cooperation. However, they did not eventually merge. Rather, most of the EFTA countries joined the Community. This is because trade diversion created what Baldwin has called a “Domino effect,” where all states eventually gravitated towards joining the larger market. As Baldwin notes, “The final result was that the two blocs collapsed into one. The lesson for Asia today is that you cannot have two FTA blocs near each other. Once regional integration starts, it is hard to resist (Baldwin 2003)” (Also, Baldwin, this volume).

Subgroups may also present inter-organizational conflicts. For example, in Latin America, Mercosur members cannot join the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), a smaller trade bloc that includes Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, because Mercosur's charter prohibits its Free Trade Agreements with nonmember nations. Thus, to join Mercosur, Venezuela had to leave CAN. However, Bolivia, which also aims to join Mercosur, refuses to leave CAN. To address the problem, CAN and Mercosur leaders have agreed to form a third organization, Unasur, which could eventually replace both organizations.²⁰

A similar potential lies in Asia. Here, several regional organizations now have overlapping membership and overlapping agendas. As Dent (this volume) notes, there is a risk that organizations such as the ASEAN+3 or EAS have competing goals and a duplicate efforts on issues such as free trade and energy security. Thus, the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry has warned that “Less can be More,” because “While ASEAN, ASEAN+3, APEC, ARF and the EAS are all potentially useful regional bodies, their mutual existence has the real potential to result in duplication of effort and dilute outcomes for both businesses and countries in our region.”²¹

4.4. Option 4: Differentiated integration

Organizations can also use differentiated integration to overcome the challenges of heterogeneity. Differentiated integration refers to how an organization's existing member states may pursue future integration *within* the organization (as opposed to the layered integration above, which is separate institutions). Here again lessons are best drawn from the EU, where three modes of differentiated integration have occurred, and where, it should be noted, significant debate continues about which of these is the best approach to future cooperation.

4.4.1. Multi-speed integration

Multi-speed integration refers to the fact that states integrate at different times. Multispeed integration is when “the pursuit of common objectives is driven by a core group of member states which are both able and willing to go further, the underlying assumption being that the others will follow later” (Stubb 1996 287). Multispeed is exemplified by the EMU, the harmonization of VAT, as well as by the accession agreements and transition periods given to states. Thus, with EU accession all new member states became members of the EMU, but they have derogations according to Article 7c of the EC treaty. Although most new member states are eager to join, this means that they can postpone EMU membership by not meeting the Maastricht criteria, as Sweden has done so far (De Grauwe and Schnabl 2005 3). Similarly,

²⁰ <http://www.cfr.org/publication/12762/#p6>

²¹ [Press Release, “Asian Regionalism: Less can be More.” Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. February 2006.](#)

Article 115 of the EC treaty allows states to take temporary protective measures against third country imports (Stubb 1996 291).

Multi-speed integration has also been used vis-à-vis new member states in the EU. Transition periods can be particularly useful in economic areas where they decouple the institutional commitment from the stresses of adjustment. Thus, long transition periods have helped ease the process of transition to full membership for both old and new members (Winters 1997 910). In political areas, however, transition periods can be detrimental to achieving eventual compliance. For example, the Council of Europe has often used transition periods, giving new member states a fixed period to comply with certain democratic standards. Once admitted, however, states have been likely to ignore these requirements (Kelley 2004a).

Some multi-speed integration may also have developed in Asia, with the “ASEAN-x” possibility embedded in the new 2007 Charter, and the “X+2” approach that allows two member countries to integrate certain sectors can go ahead before others are ready to join them.²²

4.4.2. Variable geometry

Smaller groups can also enhance their cooperation even within large group settings, as demonstrated by the EU’s use of so-called “variable geometry,” the most prominent example being the monetary union (Alesina and Grilli 1993). Variable geometry is “a mode of differentiated integration which admits to unattainable differences within the main integrative structure by allowing permanent or irreversible separation between a core of countries and lesser developed integrative units” (Stubb 1996 287).

Thus, variable geometry differentiates integration across space rather than time. It is a more permanent acceptance of the fact that some states do not wish to participate in certain objectives. It allows more stable separation between hard core and periphery, permitting a core group of states to advance their cooperation without the rest. The term is most often used to describe differential integration within the EU. Here examples include Airbus, EUROFOR, Schengen, and the EMS (Stubb 1996).

More recent examples can also be found in Africa. For example: “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was developed by the five initial states of the OAU (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa) and formally adopted in July 2001. NEPAD’s primary objectives are poverty eradication, sustainable development, and integrating Africa into the global economy. It focuses on establishing partnerships with industrial countries for increased aid, foreign investment, debt relief, and market access. In 2002, NEPAD was placed under the purview of the AU; a committee reports annually to the AU Assembly. In March 2007, NEPAD leaders decided the partnership should be integrated into the structures and processes of the AU.”²³

4.4.3. À la carte

À la carte integration is when member states can simply pick and choose what policy areas they want to participate in while sharing only a minimum number of common objectives. Thus, it is differential integration across matter, as opposed to time or space. Thus, rather than a group of

²² <http://www.iseas.edu.sg/viewpoint/dhocht03.pdf>

²³ http://www.cfr.org/publication/11616/african_union.html, <http://www.prlog.org/10132837-united-states-of-africa-african-economic-community.html>

states advancing with integration on a certain issue, a la carte integration occurs when individual states opt out of cooperation that is proceeding among the rest of the organization. Examples include Denmark and the UK with the Euro, Denmark with defense and the UK with social policy, and Ireland on abortion (Stubb 1996 286). A la carte integration is the least visionary mode of integration, and perhaps it has so far been used mostly as emergency options when single countries have been unable to agree to further integration steps. As such, it is an important tool to circumventing consensus decision-making procedures, although it is not a way to promote comprehensive regional integration.

4.4.4. Advantages of differentiated integration

The point of these differentiated forms of integration is not the typology itself, but that options exist for organizations to vary the membership modes even within the organization. Using multi-speed integration, for example, allows deeper cooperation to evolve, because it is not necessary to wait for all states to be prepared to undertake the commitments of cooperation. Existing convoy organizations can include all member states in the visionary discussions of future integration, and then the prepared states can commence without excluding the other states, because these states are already on course to join the cooperation when they are ready, and they have had some voice in creating the institutional structures and rules. Thus, they non-participants remain outside, but not excluded.

On the other hand, using variable geometry allows an organization to move beyond seemingly irreconcilable differences without abandoning the organization as the regional framework for cooperation. Of course, variable geometry need not mean that initially disinterested countries cannot join the cooperation in the future, only that at the time of negotiation, they have expressed no intention to do so and are under no obligation to do so. Both multi-speed and variable geometry therefore offer options for convoy organizations whose membership is too heterogeneous for the organization to deepen *en masse*.

The danger of course, is that multi-speed ends up being more permanent, thus actually being variable geometry. This can occur if some states forge far ahead of poorer countries, for example, without providing assistance for these countries to catch up.

Although all of these modes of differentiated integration fall short of deep and comprehensive integration, they may be important alternative to the paralysis that might otherwise be produced by heterogeneous convoys. Over decades, they may turn out to be important stepping-stones to fuller integration.

Furthermore, using differentiated forms of integration may allow organizations to make better use of the tools of clubs, even if the overarching organization is a convoy. By having states that remain outside cooperation, "entry-requirements" can be made for states wishing to join. Such requirements are often already built into multi-speed integration, where they benefit from an inclusionary process of debate, such that late joiners have had a voice in the rules from the start. When organizations use variable geometry, the states that opt for deeper cooperation may eventually display such benefits from their cooperation that the other states wish to join. In that case, the core group is able to use the tools of conditionality to ensure that states only join when they are committed and capable of cooperating.

Table 2 summarizes the different membership options.

Table 2: Membership options

| Options | Description | Advantages and Disadvantages |
|---|---|---|
| Membership and participation rules | Organizations set rules for membership and participation ranging from convoys to clubs, or any level in-between. | Rules allow organizations to shape their membership and exert different forms of influence, but they can be politically contentious to enforce. |
| | Convoys Convoy organizations have low entry and participation requirements | Convoys are inclusive and enable the organization to engage with all the states in the region. Convoys may be particularly well suited for socializing regional states. On some issue areas such as security, for example, the conciliatory and inclusive nature of convoy organizations may retain advantages over clubs |
| | Clubs Clubs have high entry and participation requirements. | Clubs are better able to sue the tools of membership conditionality, monitoring, expulsion or suspension. On complex regulatory matters, clubs are better able to ensure that new entrants can meet the expectations of membership. |
| | Degrees of Membership Organizations can use observer and associate status to interact with regional states. Observer states sometimes are states that do not have a prospect of full membership, but associate states may be members-in-waiting. Observer states usually have few rights within the organization except to observe. Associate members, however, often have some rights and can obtain benefits from the organization. | Multiple levels of association allow organizations to use different participation requirements for different levels. In both cases, an organization may be able to bring countries into their institutional forums by granting them such intermediate levels of access. This may enable these states to be part of important debates within the organization and can provide opportunities both for socialization as well as for continued leverage over prospective members. |
| | Revisiting entry requirements Organizations can introduce new entry requirements any time, even if such have not traditionally existed. | Changing entry requirements allows them to evolve as an organization deepens its scope and depth of cooperation. Thus convoy organizations need not remain convoys with respect to future members. |


Table 2: Membership options, continued.

| Options | Description | Advantages and Disadvantages |
|--|--|--|
| Multiple regional organizations | Regions develop an array of organizations to address their cooperation needs | While layered integration is beneficial, sub-grouping can introduce problems |
| | Layered integration through complementary institutions Although regions have created a convoy organization, not all cooperation need proceed within the frameworks of this organization. Rather, regions can take a layered approach to integration by creating multiple institutions to address different issues. Europe has again been particularly successful at using this structure of complementary institutions. | This approach allows regions to apply different organizational membership models to different issues. Given that the nature of different issue areas may favor different membership models, this differentiation can be advantageous. Furthermore, as opposed to the models of differential integration described below, complementary institutions can have completely separate decision-making and administrative structures. This can allow greater institutional autonomy and avoid complex hierarchies within one organization. |
| | Sub-grouping States in a region form subgroups that can exploit their homogeneity and smaller size to form multiple organizations. Thus a region ends up with multiple sub-regional organizations that individually pursue the same objectives, such as for example, coexisting common markets that cover different countries within the same region. The difference between sub-grouping and layering is that layered integration consists of regional organizations that address different issues, whereas sub-grouping consists of organizations that address the same issues, but do so in smaller groups. | Risks a very fragmented structure of regional and sub-regional organizations that progress towards their stated goals at very different speeds and processes. This greatly complicates the attainment of larger regional integration, despite rhetorical commitment to these goals. Overlapping membership and overlapping agendas may present inter-organizational conflicts and produce duplication of effort and diluted outcomes. |

Table 2: Membership options, continued.

| Options | Description | Advantages and Disadvantages |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|
| Differentiated integration | Use of either multi-speed integration, variable geometry or à la carte integration as described below | Differentiated integration allows organizations to make better use of the tools of clubs, even if the overarching organization is a convoy. By having states that remain outside cooperation, “entry-requirements” can be made for states wishing to join. |
| | Multi-speed integration refers to the fact that states integrate at different times. A core group proceeds with the expectation that others will follow when they are ready. | Allows some states more time to prepare for cooperation (transition periods) without holding up the whole organization. Non-participants remain outside, but not excluded from cooperation. Non-participants benefit from an inclusionary process of debate, such that late joiners have had a voice in the rules from the start. Multi-speed integration can be useful in economic areas by decoupling the institutional commitment from the stresses of adjustment. In political areas, however, transition periods can be detrimental to achieving eventual compliance. |
| | Variable geometry differentiates integration across space. It is a more permanent acceptance of the fact that some states do not wish to participate in certain objectives. Other states can later join, but they are not required to. | Allowing more stable separation between hard core and periphery states can permit a core group of states to advance their cooperation without the rest, while still preserving the regional organization. When organizations use variable geometry, the states that opt for deeper cooperation may eventually display such benefits from their cooperation that the other states wish to join. In that case, the core group is able to use the tools of conditionality to ensure that states only join when they are committed and capable of cooperating. Variable geometry risks dividing the member states and therefore introduces multiple possible issues for cooperation. |
| | À la carte integration is differential integration across matter. Member states pick and choose what policy areas to participate in and share only minimal common objectives. | À la carte integration prevents a single member state or a few states from entirely blocking cooperation. The lack of shared vision, however, undermines comprehensive regional integration, making it more ad hoc. |

Figure 2: The expounded “R-H-I” relationship



5. Questions for Asia

Figure 2 summarizes the arguments of this paper: Rules do reflect state preferences, but regions can also employ a variety of organizational forms and rules. These rules have different features that enable organizations to use various ex ante and ex post tools to influence the heterogeneity of states in the region. This heterogeneity in turn influences the ability of regional states to build strong joint institutions and therefore prospect for successful regional integration.

Asia remains a highly heterogeneous region among a number of key dimensions (Haggard, this volume; Hix, this volume) that include preferences, capacities and beliefs. Convergence in these areas will be difficult to achieve, and therefore the foundation for regional integration is weaker than in Europe. Regional comparisons should therefore be made with great caution. Unlike in Europe, in Asia market forces, not political forces, have been driving economic integration (Asian Development Bank 2008), and this leaves much less room for grand political planning. The foundation for integration in Asia is further weakened by the strong antipathy towards delegation of authority to supranational institutions (Baldwin, this volume, 64-65).

However, this heterogeneity and aversion to supra nationalism, coupled with a norm of consensual processes, makes it important for Asia to consider the design of membership rules in regional organizations. This paper has argued that to the extent that it is possible to bring about greater convergence of preferences, capacities and beliefs, regional integration will be more likely to succeed. Furthermore, it has argued that membership rules may help bringing about greater convergence because they can provide different opportunities for influencing the preferences, capacities and beliefs of states in the region over time.

This paper has been focused on the role of membership rules more broadly and has not provided a blue print for the design of membership rules in Asian institutions. However, it does generate some questions for consideration in the Asian context for those with greater expertise in the region:

1. *May organizations in Asia possibly take greater advantages of tiers of membership, thus avoiding outright exclusion, but yet reserving some leverage?*

This paper suggests that clubs have considerable advantages over convoys when in terms of bringing convergence among states and thus deepening economic and regional integration. However, it also suggests that there are several ways that a region can use club-like features. The existing convoy structures of Asian institutions may make it unlikely that new organizations of core heterogeneous states can start independently of existing institutions. However, there may still be ways for Asian institution to take advantage of club-features. For example, existing organizations may make use of a wider range of associational forms of membership before admitting states fully. Although it is difficult, existing institutions can change their membership rules for new members, and thus possible adopt new tiers of membership. The criteria and

process for joining the EU, for example, has evolved greatly over time. This may also grow out of functional needs, as organizations with deeper integration will have a greater set of rules and regulations to which new member states will need to adopt.

2. How can organizations in Asia make better use of differential integration?

Differential integration can create tiers of members within an organization of heterogeneous preferences. However, variable geometry does provide ways for broader, convoy-like organizations to break deadlock and advance cooperation. This need not proceed on a permanently exclusionary basis. Should some of the initial non-participants wish to join later, such an arrangement also creates leverage that the existing participants can apply to promote greater convergence before new states join.

When states agree on the common objective, but have heterogeneous capacities, multi-speed integration provides a way for states to introduce participation requirements without complete exclusion. States not ready to participate can still take part in negotiations and the framing of the cooperation. They can remain as observers in the cooperation, and then join when they are ready. Might Asian organizations usefully apply this concept? Some Asian organizations already grant transitional periods for new members, but this concept can be used also when a set of existing states within an organization wish to proceed.

The caveat, however, is to use mechanisms to assist non-participants in joining, rather than creating permanent classes of rich and poor member states.

3. Can Asia benefit from layered integration, which allows countries to adapt the membership model to the issue at hand, because all issues are not bundled in one institution?

The paper suggests convoys may have some comparative advantages over clubs on certain issues. Some issue areas lend themselves much better to socialization than others. Whereas it is harder to socialize states into lowering their tariffs, socialization may be the best way to address human rights or security, for example. The paper suggests that Europe benefitted from a layered regional integration, which allowed different organizations to use different membership models, thus being inclusive on topics where inclusiveness was advantages. Is layered integration a better solution to some current institutional proliferation within Asian organizations? Is a Human Rights Commission really best situated within the ASEAN framework, for instance?

4. What membership rules can Asia use to avoid inefficient sub-regional fragmentation?

Latin America and Africa have both experienced a proliferation of regional economic integration efforts. In Africa the multitude of RECs has led to confusion, and in Latin America it has highlighted that the lesson learned in Europe, namely that regional economic institutions do not sit easily side by side. Asia is running the risk of developing too many overlapping and competing institutions. Rethinking membership rules in current institutions and ways to work from within these institutions may help avoid fragmentation. For example, may some organizations think about enlarging to include states that were not originally conceived as geographic candidates, to avoid institutional proliferation?

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